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WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
plaintiff, acting under Ohio General Code Section 9510-4, filed a supple-
mentary petition against the defendanes insurance company. The company
defended on the ground of breach of condition by the insured in failing to
cooperate. The court held that the plaintiff could not have knowledge of
transactions between the company and the insured. "A defense on the
ground of the assured's violation of cooperation clause is an affirmative one
on which the insurer carries the burden of proof."'9 The only evidence pre-
sented was as to the insured's failure to appear in court and this was held
insufficient to sustain the defense. Recovery on the supplemental pention
was allowed.
EDGAR I. KING
LABOR LAW
Labor law decisions in 1952 were chiefly in three areas: picketing,
union-member relationships and specific performance of labor agreements.
Picketing
The Ohio Supreme Court in W.E. Anderson Sons, Inc. v. Local Union
No. 3111 upheld an injunction prohibiting peaceful picketing. The em-
ployer, Anderson, Inc., hired non-union truck drivers. It agreed to haul
gravel for a sub-contractor in a building project at Ohio State University.
Teamsters picketed the building site seeking to force Anderson, Inc. to hire
union drivers. Union workers for other sub-contractors refused to cross the
picket line, thereby stopping work on the project. The majority of the
court interpreted the economic pressure exercised against the general con-
tractor to force the discharge of the non-union employer from the project
as an enjoinable secondary boycott. The dissent emphasized that the picket-
ing was peaceful and that the economic pressure was applied "on the job"
where non-union truckers were working. The dissent reasoned that the
job site was a proper area in which the union truckers could exercise this
right of free speech.
The traditional secondary boycott situation, has been the picketing of a
third party, not involved in the labor dispute, whose place of business is re-
moved from the area where the employer-union clash occurs. In building
projects, however, the third party's place of business can be part of this
area. To bar picketing here protects the innocent third party but effectively
SId. at 463, 107 N.E.2d at 397
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prevents the union from peacefully presenting its case at the point where
it will have the most effect - the area of direct economic conflict.
In Nicholson v. Vending Machme Service Employees2 it was held that
when a restaurant owner contracts with a non-union jukebox operator to
install a music machine in his restaurant and to share the gross receipts a
union can peacefully picket the restaurant as part of its campaign to pressure
the jukebox operator to join the union and no secondary boycott thereby
results.3
Union-Member Relationships
In Armstrong v. Duffy' union members brought suit against union
officials for fraud in union elections. After the suit was filed the union's
national convention amended the union constitution prohibiting court ac-
tion unless internal union remedies had been exhausted. The court held
that a union cannot amend its constitution to operate retroactively against a
member by prohibiting the election of the member to union office for
ten years. This punishment was held to violate Amendment XIV of the
United States Constitution; Acticle I, Section 16 of the Ohio Constitution,
and Ohio General Code Section 12866.
While courts generally refuse to control the internal affairs of a union,
it was emphasized in Crosse= v. Duffy" that courts should protect demo-
cratic processes in a union. Since unions often control the right to work,
union members cannot be punished by the union for publishing and dis-
tributing handbills fairly criticmng union officials. The members' consti-
tutional right to free speech is entitled to protection. The court distinguished
an earlier case, Pfoh v. Whtney, in which a member was held properly
expelled under similar facts but in which no claim was made that the union
procedure was unconstitutional.
In Duggms v. Unted Brotherhood of Carpenteri the court, applying
the strict rule that the relationship between a union and its members is con-
tractual, denied recovery of death benefits to the widow of a union member
who had not paid his dues where the union constitution provided for sus-
pension of death benefits in such event.
1 156 Ohio St. 541, 104 N.E.2d 22 (1952).
1104 N.E.2d 473 (Summit Com. PL 1952).
'Picketing was considered rn two other Ohio cases reported in 1952. Bell v. Rogers,
107 N.E.2d 136 (Summit Com. PL 1952); State ex rel. Ohio Power Co. v. Utility
Workers of America, 103 N.E.2d 49 (Muskingum Com. PL 1951).
'90 Ohio App. 233, 103 N.E.2d 760 (1951).
'90 Ohio App. 252, 103 N.E.2d 769 (1951). For a further discussion of the case
see ToRTs article, mfra.
'62 N.Y2d 744 (Ohio App. 1945).
'90 Ohio App. 59, 102 NE.2d 606 (1951).
19531
